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NCAA SANCTIONS: ASSIGNING BLAME 
WHERE IT BELONGS 
Maureen A. Weston* 
Abstract: Success in a major intercollegiate athletic program, particularly 
a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I national 
championship, can translate into millions of dollars and immense pride 
for the players, coaches, alumni, fans, and university. It can also be a de-
terminative factor in a highly recruited high school student-athlete’s pro-
gram selection decision. In this intensely competitive environment, temp-
tations to cheat, exploit, or circumvent the rules lurk, not only for agents, 
but also for institutional personnel, certain student-athletes, boosters, and 
even parents. Acting on behalf of over 1200 member institutions, the 
NCAA regulates and enforces rules of amateurism in college. In recent 
cases involving high-profile student-athletes and programs found to have 
engaged in cheating and major infractions of NCAA rules on amateurism, 
agents, and extra-benefits to players, the NCAA imposed stringent sanc-
tions, including bans on postseason competition, against member institu-
tions and the offending athletic programs. This Article analyzes the effec-
tiveness of these sanctions on the offending programs, actual wrongdoers, 
and student-athletes most impacted by sanctions. The Article asserts that 
the sanctions’ reach is both overly limited and overly broad. NCAA sanc-
tion powers are narrow in that they extend only to member institutions, 
not to individual coaches, players, agents, boosters, or other involved in-
dividuals. The sanctions are broad in that they negatively impact current 
student-athletes, who are restricted in their ability to transfer without 
penalty. The Article makes proposals for holding coaches and institutions 
financially accountable for infractions, while protecting uninvolved stu-
dent-athletes. 
Introduction 
 Without a doubt, everyone loves a winning team. Success in a ma-
jor athletic program, particularly a National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) Division I national championship, translates into millions 
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of dollars and immense pride for the players, coaches, alumni, stu-
dents, and the university.1 A major intercollegiate athletics program 
can also have a positive impact on the academic mission of a university.2 
Revenues from broadcast rights and merchandise sales, admissions ap-
plications, and fundraising for the entire university are enhanced. A 
winning program can also catapult the recruiting process and be a de-
terminative factor in a sought-after high school student-athlete’s choice 
of university.3 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See, e.g., Stephanie F. Hughes & Matthew D. Shank, Assessing the Impact of NCAA Scandals: 
An Exploratory Analysis, 3 Int’l J. Sport Mgmt. & Marketing 78, 80–81 (2009) (reporting a 
positive relationship between athletic success and donor contributions and stating that “ath-
letic success increases national exposure regardless of the school’s academic reputation and 
post-season appearances appear to increase general giving to universities”); Dionne L. Koller, 
How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of National 
Prestige, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 1465, 1488–89 n.121 (describing the use of sport to enhance na-
tional prestige and image, while also demonstrating national morality through “zero toler-
ance” discipline of rule-breakers, such as doping offenders); Billy Witz, Trojans’ Culture of Fun 
Meets Era of Compliance, N.Y. Times, July 22, 2010, at B16, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2010/07/22/sports/ncaafootball/22usc.html (noting a “boom in university fund-
raising and an increased academic profile” accompanied the University of Southern Califor-
nia (USC) football program’s success—and revenue totaling $35.2 million in the 2008–2009 
academic year, and quoting University of Kentucky Professor John Thelin who stated, “‘In the 
case of U.S.C., whatever excesses they’ve had in football have been parlayed into good things 
for the institution. . . . It hasn’t drained off money from other places; it’s probably had a mul-
tiplier effect.’”). 
2 See Matthew J. Mitten et al., Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics: A Proposal for Targeted 
Reform Consistent with American Cultural Forces and Marketplace Realities, 2 J. Intercollegiate 
Sport 202, 203 (2009) (noting that universities “rationally invest substantial resources in 
their athletic departments, as a means to achieve a wide range of legitimate objectives that 
further their missions . . . [including] attracting faculty, students, and student-athletes,” as 
well as diversifying the student body and strengthening relationships with alumni and the 
local community, and conferring an enhanced reputation). 
3 See, e.g., Hughes & Shank, supra note 1, at 80–81. In 2010, the NCAA signed a four-
teen-year, $10.8 billion contract with CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting to televise the 
popular “March Madness” Division I basketball tournament. See Alan Scher Zagier, Knight 
Commission Blasts Runaway Spending in College Sports, Diverse: Issues Higher Educ., June 
18, 2010, http://diverseeducation.com/article/13897/; see also James A. R. Nafziger, In-
ternational Sports Law 10 (2d ed. 2004) (“Revenue from ticket sales alone normally 
exceeds $100 million. Business enterprises pay millions of dollars for official designation of 
their products. Rights to broadcast the Olympic Games . . . have soared to about U.S. $2.5 
billion in 2006 and 2008.”). The money focus in college sports became pronounced in the 
summer 2010 conference realignment negotiations, where smaller schools risked being 
squeezed out of the multi-million dollar revenues earned as conference members. See 
Courtney Linehan, Breaking Down the Money in Conference Realignment, LubbockOnline: 
Lubbock Avalanche-Journal ( June 9, 2010), http://lubbockonline.com/interact/blog-
post/courtney-linehan/2010-06-09/breaking-down-money-conference-realignment (“All 
this realignment stuff has nothing to do with academics, research, rivalries or any of the 
myriad other reasons fans and alumni love their schools. It’s all about money from TV 
contracts, plain and simple.”); Jim Reeves, Eyes of Pac-10, Big Ten, SEC on Texas, ESPNDal-
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 Along with the tangible benefits and lure of winning is the intense 
pressure to win.4 The pressure in competitive sports starts at an early age 
for student-athletes. The love of the sport, as well as the prospects for a 
collegiate scholarship and a potentially lucrative professional sports ca-
reer, motivate young athletes to devote years to intense training and 
competition. Many families spend thousands of dollars to provide in-
struction and competitive development opportunities to their children.5 
Coaches are certainly invested as well, with their job security, status, and 
compensation packages largely dependent upon producing winning 
programs.6 For better or worse, scouts and agents are on watch to iden-
tify and attract star athletes as future professional sport clients.7 Like-
wise, the professional sport leagues are eager to sign young talent to 
their rosters (not necessarily waiting until the players are college gradu-
ates).8 The opportunity to participate in a major collegiate athletic pro-
gram provides not only an opportunity for higher education, but also a 
venue to showcase athletic prowess, and opens doors to professional 
play and seemingly attendant fame and fortune. 
                                                                                                                      
las.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/dallas/ncb/columns/story?columnist=reeves_jim&id 
=5263837 (last updated June 8, 2010) (describing the power of the University of Texas in 
terms of the Big 12 realignment). 
4 See Mitten et al., supra note 2, at 204 (describing the psychological, cultural, and eco-
nomic underpinnings of intercollegiate athletics). The “primal competitive drive” to win 
was firmly rooted long before the NCAA’s inception. See id. 
5 See Christy Rakoczy, How Much Do Americans Spend on Sports Each Year?, YourDiction-
ary.com, http://answers.yourdictionary.com/answers/sports/how-much-do-americans-spend-
on-sports-each-year.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (estimating that American parents spend 
nearly $300 million annually on registration fees for their children’s sporting programs and 
that, when the cost of equipment and travel is included, the figure drastically increases to $900 
million). 
6 See Josephine ( Jo) R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement, and 
Infractions Processes: The Laws that Regulate Them and the Nature of Court Review, 12 Vand. J. 
Ent. & Tech. L. 257, 263 (2010) (“Coaches are under great pressure to win, particularly in 
the Division I FBS revenue-producing sports. They are hired, compensated, and fired 
based on their win-loss records.”). 
7 See Jamie Nomura, Refereeing the Recruiting Game: Applying Contract Law to Make the In-
tercollegiate Recruitment Process Fair, 32 U. Haw. L. Rev. 275, 282 (2009) (“Because recruiting 
efforts are increasingly competitive, universities are making verbal scholarship offers to 
recruits as young as thirteen years old.”); Scott Powers, Summer Session: College Coaches Set-
ting Sights Younger and Younger, ESPN Mag., July 17, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
espnmag/story?id=3490678 (reporting that college coaches are increasingly concerned 
with “scouting and possibly securing commitments from incoming eighth graders, fresh-
men, sophomores and juniors”). See generally Alfred C. Yen, Early Scholarship Offers and the 
NCAA, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 585 (2011) (discussing the disturbing trend of recruitment at even 
younger ages and proposing reform). 
8 Tariq Engineer, How Young is Too Young?, Lawrentian (Lawrence Univ., Appleton, Wis.), 
Jan. 29, 2002, http://www.lawrentian.com/2.15232/how-young-is-too-young-1.1988878. 
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 The relatively few student-athletes talented, able, and fortunate 
enough to compete in major intercollegiate sports are highly recruited.9 
The courtship includes promises of scholarships, extensive playing op-
portunities, and prospects for a professional athletic career.10 The lure 
of an opportunity to play for a university in an NCAA national champi-
onship tournament, or to compete in a Bowl Championship Series 
(BCS) game among select NCAA Division I football teams can prove 
pivotal in a recruit’s decision. 
 Founded in 1906, the NCAA was formed for the purpose of ad-
ministering intercollegiate athletics. A fundamental purpose of the or-
ganization today is to ensure that the competitive athletics programs of 
member institutions are a vital part of the education process, that stu-
dent-athletes are an “integral part of the student body,” and that college 
sports retain their hallmark—amateurism.11 As an association of over 
1200 member institutions, the NCAA has promulgated and enforced 
rules that govern nearly every aspect of competition, and the student-
athlete’s experience, with an aim to ensuring competitive fairness and 
protecting the interests of student-athletes.12 In the practical reality of 
the “arms race” in major collegiate sports, however, these principles are 
often violated.13 Some rule violations are minor and relatively inconse-
quential. Other violations are egregious, such as payments or a range of 
impermissible extra benefits provided to players or their families, aca-
demic fraud, and recruiting abuses by coaches or agents.14 Unfortu-
                                                                                                                      
 
9 See sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
10 For an example of the benefits available to a highly touted athlete, see infra note 18 
and accompanying text regarding Reggie Bush. 
11 See NCAA Const. arts. 1–2, in Division I Manual (2009), available at http://www. 
ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D110.pdf; History, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are/About+the+NC
AA+history (last updated Nov. 8, 2010); see also, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 Marq. 
Sports L. Rev. 9, 12 (2000). The NCAA Constitution states that the “basic purpose” of the 
NCAA is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a 
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” NCAA 
Const., supra, art. 1.3.1. 
12 See NCAA Const., supra note 11, arts. 1–2. 
13 See, e.g., Daniel L. Fulks, Arms Race Debate Open to Interpretation, NCAA News (April 12, 
2004), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2004/Editorial/arms+race+debate+ 
open+to+interpretation+-+4-12-04.html; NCAA Eyes Ban to Certain Early Offers, ESPN, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5372984 (last updated July 12, 2010). 
14 NCAA Operating Bylaws art. 16, in Division I Manual (2009) (Awards, Benefits 
and Expenses for Enrolled Student-Athletes), available at http://www.ncaapublications. 
com/productdownloads/D110.pdf; see id. art. 16.02.3 (defining an “extra benefit” as “any 
special arrangement by an institutional employee or a representative of the institution’s 
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nately, such cheating may yield huge profits and competitive advantages 
for the involved individuals, athletic program, and institutions. 
 In this competitive environment, some coaches, players, agents, 
boosters, institutional members, and even parents succumb to the temp-
tation to cheat.15 For example, a recent case drawing national attention 
involved the University of Southern California (USC).16 The case in-
volved allegations of cheating in football and men’s basketball by two of 
the most high-profile student-athletes ever to attend USC.17 Heisman 
Trophy winner Reggie Bush, who led the Trojans to a national football 
championship in 2004, was found to have accepted thousands of dollars 
in cash payments, airline tickets for his parents to attend away football 
games, a free limousine service, expensive clothing, a vehicle, free lodg-
ing in Las Vegas, and a rent-free home and cash for his parents.18 Tragi-
cally, Reggie Bush’s mother and stepfather were at the center of the 
cheating scandal: they promised to deliver Bush as a client to prospec-
tive agents Lloyd Lake and Michael Michaels in exchange for free hous-
ing and the expectation of additional payments.19 When Bush declared 
for the National Football League (NFL) draft and signed with a differ-
ent agent, Lake and Michaels sued to get their money back and thus 
made the allegations public.20 Similarly, the USC basketball program 
                                                                                                                      
 
athletics interests to provide a student-athlete or the student-athlete’s relative or friend a 
benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation”); George Dohrmann, Confessions of 
an Agent, Sports Illustrated, Oct. 18, 2010, at 64–70 (reporting that ex-NFL player 
agent Josh Luchs admitted to having paid thousands of dollars, in addition to other bene-
fits, to more than thirty college football players from 1990 to 1996). 
15 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 14; see also infra text accompanying note 20. 
16 See NCAA, University of Southern California Public Infractions Report 1 
(2010) [hereinafter USC Infractions Report], available at http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
connect/public/NCAA/Resources/News+Releases/2010+News+Releases (follow “June 
10, 2010—Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on University of Southern 
California” hyperlink; then follow “Related Links: University of Southern California—
Public Infractions Report” hyperlink). 
17 See id. The NCAA report does not refer to the student-athletes by name other than 
“student-athlete 1,” who is Reggie Bush, and “student-athlete 2,” O.J. Mayo. Id. at 2. Re-
ports have confirmed the identities. See USC Trojans Hit Hard by NCAA, USCFootball.com 
( June 10, 2010), http://usc.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=1093088. 
18 See USC Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 4–22. 
19 See Bush Says Family Has Done ‘Absolutely Nothing Wrong,’ ESPN, http://sports.espn. 
go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2419079 (last updated Apr. 25, 2006) (“The Pac-10 said Sun-
day it will investigate the reported connection between Bush's family and Michaels, who 
sought to market the Southern California star tailback.”). 
20 See Jill Lieber Steeg, Lloyd Lake, Figure in Reggie Bush Probes, Breaks Silence, USA Today, 
Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2008-01-17-reggiebush-
book_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip. Similarly, the father of Auburn quarterback and Heisman 
Trophy winner Cam Newton engaged in a “pay for play” scheme where he marketed his tal-
ented son to prospective college football programs, seeking a substantial amount of money in 
556 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:551 
infractions case involved violations in the recruiting process and allega-
tions that a booster, considered a representative of an institution’s ath-
letics interests per the NCAA bylaws,21 made payments to an influential 
Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) coach in order to ensure that O.J. Mayo, 
then the top high school recruit in the country, signed with USC.22 
 After an extensive investigation and hearing involving USC, the 
NCAA determined that the institution knew or should have known 
about these violations and that it thus breached its duty of maintaining 
institutional control over its athletics programs.23 In a sixty-seven-page 
report dated June 10, 2010, the NCAA Committee on Infractions (the 
                                                                                                                      
exchange for his son’s commitment to play. See Pete Thamel, Auburn’s Newton May Leave a 
Legacy in Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2011, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/01/10/sports/ncaafootball/10auburn.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq=cam%20newton 
&st=cse; Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Addresses Cam Newton’s Eligibility (Dec. 1, 2010), 
available at http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/News+Releases/ 
2010+News+Releases (follow “Dec. 1, 2010—NCAA Addresses Cam Newton’s Eligibility” 
hyperlink). 
21 See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 13.02.13. The Bylaws require that 
a “representative of the institution’s athletics interests” is an individual, inde-
pendent agency, corporate entity (e.g., apparel or equipment manufacturer) 
or other organization who is known (or who should have been known) by a 
member of the institution’s executive or athletics administration to: (a) Have 
participated in or to be a member of an agency or organization promoting 
the institution’s intercollegiate athletics program; (b) Have made financial 
contributions to the athletics department or to an athletics booster organiza-
tion of that institution; (c) Be assisting or to have been requested (by the ath-
letics department staff) to assist in the recruitment of prospective student-
athletes; (d) Be assisting or to have assisted in providing benefits to enrolled 
student-athletes or their families; or (e) Have been involved otherwise in 
promoting the institution’s athletics program. 
Id. 
22 See USC Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 2. Allegations were also made that a 
member of the USC coaching staff was involved, but findings were only made as to the 
booster and as to the fact that USC knew or should have known that such payments were 
being made to Mayo, but chose to look the other way. Id at 4, 37–38, 45. The NCAA report 
also made findings that the former head football coach violated the coaching staff limita-
tions in hiring a consultant for the entire 2008 playing season, impermissible recruiting 
contacts by a booster. See id. at 37–38. A major violation involving a former women’s tennis 
student-athlete making unauthorized personal international telephone calls was also 
found. See id. at 45. 
23 See id. (“From December 2004 through March 2009, the institution exhibited a lack 
of control over its department of athletics by its failure to have in place procedures to ef-
fectively monitor the violations of NCAA amateurism, recruiting and extra benefit legisla-
tion in the sports of football, men’s basketball and women’s tennis.”); see also College Basket-
ball: USC Punishes Itself for O.J. Mayo Scandal, Seattle Times, Jan. 3, 2010, http://seattle 
times.nwsource.com/html/collegesports/2010689048_mhoop04.html (reporting that USC 
announced that it would penalize its basketball team after there were reports O.J. Mayo 
received improper gifts, including cash, clothes, and a flat-screen television). 
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“COI”) set forth extensive findings of agent and amateurism violations 
involving the two key athletes.24 With respect to the men’s basketball 
program, the NCAA accepted USC’s self-imposed sanctions, which in-
cluded a reduction in the number of scholarships, a reduction by one 
in the number of basketball coaches involved in off-campus recruiting 
for summer 2010, a reduction in the number of recruiting days by 
twenty days, and disassociation with Mayo.25 But the COI also ordered a 
return of revenues gained from Pacific-10 (Pac-10) Conference distri-
butions for USC’s participation in the NCAA men’s “Final Four” bas-
ketball championship.26 
 USC did not impose sanctions on itself as to the football program 
allegations regarding Reggie Bush. The NCAA, however, did it for 
them. Finding USC a “repeat violator” with respect to its football pro-
gram, the NCAA imposed stringent sanctions, including a two-year ban 
on postseason football competition and bowls, for seasons 2010 and 
2011, vacatur of all wins in which these students had competed (since 
December 2004), and a reduction by thirty in the number of football 
scholarships for 2011–2014.27 The NCAA also required USC to inform 
prospective student-athletes of the violations committed in these pro-
grams, of the probationary status until June 9, 2014, and of the associ-
ated penalties.28 
                                                                                                                      
 
24 See USC Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 3–55. 
25 See id. at 58–60. 
26 See id. at 59. The NCAA distributes money to the respective conferences, who in turn 
distribute revenue to individual institutions based on formulas and policies specific to each 
conference. For example, USC received $206,020 through its participation in the men’s 
2008 basketball championship. See id. 
27 See id. at 3; Baxter Holmes, USC’s History of Major NCAA Infractions, L.A. Times, June 
10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/10/sports/la-sp-0611-ncaa-sanctions-chart- 
20100611. USC has been sanctioned by the NCAA six times for major infractions, each of 
which has involved football. Holmes, supra. The prior cases were in 2001, where the NCAA 
found that tutors committed academic fraud by writing academic papers for football play-
ers; 1986, involving improper distribution of complimentary tickets, recruiting contact, 
minor recruiting inducements, and out-of-season practices and tryouts in football programs; 
1982, focusing on a ticket scheme used to funnel cash to football players—allegations also 
included academic fraud, improper employment and eligibility; 1959, where football play-
ers received air transportation beyond what is permitted by NCAA rules; and 1957, where 
football players received monthly cash allowances from an outside foundation. See USC 
Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 3. Sanctions in these cases included two-year proba-
tion, scholarship reductions, recruiting limitations for coaches, a two-year television ban, 
and a one-year postseason ban. See id. 
28 See USC Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 60. In April 2007, Bush reportedly set-
tled the lawsuit with Michaels for between $200,000 and $300,000. See Don Yaeger, Tar-
nished Heisman: Did Reggie Bush Turn His Final College Season into a Six Figure 
Job? 187 (2008). In April 2010, Bush settled the lawsuit with Lake. See Gary Klein, USC Foot-
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 Obviously, the NCAA rule violations require accountability and 
consequences. But who really pays for the sins of a few former student-
athletes, sleazy agents, or other unscrupulous individuals who associate 
themselves with an athletic program? Innocent teammates on USC’s 
2004 national football championship team now have their title va-
cated.29 Current student-athletes and incoming recruits who had com-
mitted to USC months before the USC sanctions were imposed found 
themselves on a team much different from what they envisioned, and 
are not allowed to experience postseason bowl play. Although the 
NCAA allows, with the school’s permission, juniors and seniors to trans-
fer without sitting out one year—and several USC players have since 
transferred30—incoming recruits and sophomores are bound and may 
transfer only if willing to lose an entire year of play due to the “one year 
in residence” requirement.31 In addition, neither Bush nor the agents 
can be penalized by the NCAA.32 
 Life is not always fair, but cheating never is. Consequences are 
necessary, and NCAA sanctions intentionally provide penalties for ma-
jor infractions. But do NCAA sanctions adequately punish the actual 
wrongdoers, or do they disproportionately impact current student-
athletes? NCAA bylaws provide for a process to ensure compliance with 
                                                                                                                      
ball: Depositions Canceled as Reggie Bush Settles Lawsuit Brought by Lloyd Lake, L.A. Times Fabu-
lous F. (Apr. 21, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/sports_blog/2010/04/ 
usc-football-reggie-bush-lloyd-lake-michael-michaels-ncaa-investigation-1.html; see also Total 
Econ. Athletic Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Pickens, 898 S.W.2d 98, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (up-
holding a verdict for an agent against a player for wrongful termination of the agency 
agreement despite the agent’s violation of NCAA extra benefit rules); O’Brien v. Ohio State 
Univ., No. 2004-10230, 2006 WL 571043, at *22 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 15, 2006) (holding univer-
sity liable for breach of contract for terminating coach, despite coach’s admitted violations of 
NCAA bylaws). 
29 See Jack Carey, NCAA Hits USC with Two-Year Bowl Ban, Scholarship Cuts, USA Today, 
June 11, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/pac10/2010-06-10-ncaa- 
sanctions-southern-cal_N.htm. 
30 See infra notes 111–123 and accompanying text; see also Transferring Juniors, Seniors Can 
Play, ESPNLosAngeles.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=527 
5644 (last updated June 12, 2010) (noting that juniors and seniors from USC can transfer 
schools without sitting out a season if the second school requests that the year in residence is 
waived). 
31 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 14.5. (requiring one year in resi-
dence at a new institution for a student who transfers to a member institution from any 
collegiate institution to be eligible to compete, absent a special exception). 
32 See Jim Henry, Reggie Bush Agrees to Settlement in Lloyd Lake Lawsuit, Fanhouse (Apr. 21, 
2010), http://ncaafootball.fanhouse.com/2010/04/21/report-bush-agrees-to-settlement-in- 
lake-lawsuit/ (reporting that Bush settled the lawsuit filed by Lloyd Lake a few days before his 
scheduled deposition). Bush also reportedly settled the lawsuit brought by Michael Michaels 
in April 2007 for $300,000. Id. 
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NCAA regulations and set forth a range of sanctions to be imposed 
where these rules are violated.33 NCAA member institutions agree to 
abide by this set of bylaws to ensure accountability and consequences.34 
Arguably, an entire program is complicit by virtue of association with 
rule-breakers where there is knowing disregard by institutional officials. 
But NCAA sanctions impact entire programs, innocent teammates, new 
recruits, even conference members, and yet fail to penalize many of the 
actual wrongdoers. 
 This Article examines NCAA sanctions, exploring their intended 
and unintended impacts on student-athletes, amateurism, and actual 
wrongdoers. Part I describes the NCAA enforcement process and the 
range of sanctions provided under NCAA regulations.35 Against this 
backdrop, Part II examines cases involving major infractions, including 
USC’s violations, focusing on the types of sanctions imposed and their 
respective impacts.36 Part III measures the effectiveness of NCAA sanc-
tions, in light of the rationales underlying sanctioning misconduct and 
attendant impacts, while exploring options that might better tailor sanc-
tions to fit the objectives of punishing the wrongdoers, deterring future 
misconduct, and avoiding unnecessary penalties on innocent student-
athletes.37 
I. NCAA Regulatory, Enforcement, and Sanction Powers 
 The NCAA is charged, through its membership, with regulating 
and administering collegiate sports to ensure that athletics are part of 
the educational process and to retain a “clear line of demarcation be-
tween intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”38 This Part dis-
cusses the NCAA’s power to regulate, enforce, and sanction its member 
institutions and individuals involved with those institutions.39 
 The NCAA is a voluntary association of over 1200 public and pri-
vate four-year colleges and universities, athletic conferences, and sports 
organizations (“member institutions”) committed to “the sound admini-
                                                                                                                      
33 See infra notes 38–62 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 38–62 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 38–62 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 63–106 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 107–136 and accompanying text. 
38 See NCAA Const., supra note 11, arts. 1–2. The NCAA Constitution states that the 
“basic purpose” of the NCAA is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of 
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so 
doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.” Id. art. 1.3.1. 
39 See infra notes 40–62 and accompanying text. 
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stration of intercollegiate athletics.”40 The system operates on the prin-
ciple that the member institutions are the NCAA and that “[t]he NCAA 
exists to do what no institution can do on its own: administer champion-
ships and regulate athletics competition so as to ensure a level playing 
field.”41 As a private association, NCAA members contractually and col-
lectively agree to the rules for membership and sanctions for violations 
of those rules.42 
 The NCAA is charged, through its membership, constitution, and 
bylaws, to regulate. A stated mission of the NCAA is “[t]o maintain in-
tercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the education program and 
the athlete as an integral part of the study body and, by doing so, retain 
a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and profes-
sional sports.”43 NCAA policies are intended to, among other things, 
improve athletic programs and promote opportunities for leadership. In 
addition, the NCAA regulates athletic competition among its members 
and also “[c]onducts championship events in the sports sanctioned by 
the association, enters into television and promotional contracts relating 
to these championship events, and enters into agreements to license the 
NCAA name and logos.”44 
 The NCAA is often criticized as a behemoth bureaucracy that over-
regulates college athletics in the name of amateurism, while profiting 
from the commercialism and revenue generated by interest in student-
athletes.45 NCAA regulatory powers over intercollegiate sports are in-
                                                                                                                      
 
40 See About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ncaa/NCAA/ 
About+The+NCAA/index.html?pageDesign=Printer+Friendly+General+Content+Lay 
out (last visited Mar. 17, 2011). The NCAA is an organization “through which the nation’s 
colleges and universities govern their athletics programs. It is comprised of institutions, 
conferences, organizations and individuals committed to the best interests, education and 
athletics participation of student-athletes.” Id. 
41 Potuto, supra note 6, at 262. 
42 See id. at 267 (“NCAA members articulate the association’s purposes and decide how 
it will operate, who may join, the rules governing what members are required to do, and 
the rules describing what is prohibited.”). 
43 See NCAA Const., supra note 11, art. 1.3. 
44 See Ray Yasser, James R. McCurdy, Peter Goplerud, & Maureen Weston, Sports 
Law: Cases & Materials 2 (2006). 
45 Cf., e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the “re-
stricted earnings” rule limiting assistant coaches’ salaries violated antitrust laws); Bloom v. 
NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 628 (Colo. App. 2004) (upholding NCAA rule restricting student-
athletes endorsement and media activities); Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 218–19 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. 2009) (holding that the NCAA “no agent” rule that also restricts attorneys 
from negotiating and advising student-athletes in negotiations with professional teams is 
arbitrary, ultra vires, and that the NCAA is without authority to promulgate a rule that 
prevents a lawyer from representing his client). More recently, the NCAA is under attack 
because of its use of student-athlete images in licensing of video games and other new 
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deed vast. In serving as the regulatory body for intercollegiate athletic 
programs, the NCAA establishes and enforces rules governing virtually 
every aspect of the student-athlete experience and the administration 
of intercollegiate athletics.46 These rules involve, often-times in excru-
ciating detail, regulations concerning, inter alia, initial and continuing 
academic eligibility, recruitment of prospective student-athletes, finan-
cial aid and athletic scholarships, play and practice limits, bans on the 
receipt of extra-benefits, and standards for amateurism.47 NCAA rules 
impact more than 400,000 student-athletes who participate in competi-
tive NCAA sports.48 As a condition of participating in the privilege of 
                                                                                                                      
media uses. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882 CW, 2010 
WL 445190, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (denying the NCAA’s motion to dismiss claims 
that the NCAA’s commercial licensing of the images of former student-athletes violates 
antitrust principles and constitutes unjust enrichment); Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 
C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (recognizing a right of 
publicity claim against the NCAA in its use of student-athlete images). The Keller and 
O’Bannon cases were consolidated on January 15, 2010 into In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Litigation. See No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 5644656, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 
2010) (denying certain plaintiffs’ motion to deconsolidate and referencing the January 15, 
2010 order). 
46 See Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 
59 Duke L.J. 555, 558 (2009) (discussing the restriction on attorney representatives chal-
lenged in Oliver v. NCAA as an example warranting a new, more manageable standard def-
inition of amateurism); see also Pat Borzi, Settlement Sheds Little Light on N.C.A.A. No-Agent 
Rule, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2010, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/ 
sports/baseball/24advisers.html (noting that Andy Oliver, now a professional baseball 
player for the Detroit Tigers, settled his lawsuit against the NCAA for $750,000 after the 
NCAA required Oklahoma State University to enforce the NCAA’s “no agent rule”). Al-
though NCAA bylaws permit baseball student-athletes to consult a legal advisor, the advisor 
is prohibited from directly negotiating with a professional team without jeopardizing the 
athlete’s collegiate eligibility. See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 12.3.2 (Le-
gal Counsel). 
47 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, arts. 12 (Amateurism), 13 (Recruiting), 
14 (Eligibility: Academic and General Requirements), 15 (Financial Aid), 16 (Awards, Bene-
fits and Expenses for Enrolled Students-Athletes), 17 (Playing and Practice Seasons), 18 
(Championships and Postseason Football), 23 (Academic Performance Program); see also 
Potuto, supra note 6, at 262 (“NCAA bylaws and policies cover a myriad of substantive areas as 
well as competition rules and scheduling. They even cover academic matters—the bedrock, 
non-delegable responsibility of each institution.”). The annually updated NCAA Manual, 
which sets forth the governing regulations and bylaws, registers in now at 434 pages, exclusive 
of updates. Division I Manual 1–434 (2010), available at http://www.ncaapublications. 
com/productdownloads/D111.pdf; see Symposium, The State of Division I College Athletics: Are 
We Playing by the Rules? A Debate over the Need for NCAA Regulation and Reform, 7 Vand. J. Ent. L. 
& Prac. 439 (2005) (describing the expanding scope of NCAA regulations). 
48 See John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, Spring 1996, at 71; 
see also Josh Centor, Student-Athletes Peer into the Future, NCAA News, Dec. 7, 2005, http:// 
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2006/Association-wide/student-athletes+peer+into+ 
the+future.html. 
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intercollegiate sports, these student-athletes must agree to abide by 
NCAA regulations that require waiver of certain rights enjoyed by the 
general student population.49 
 Due to its role in regulating intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA 
experiences its share of legal challenges.50 Popular criticisms against 
the NCAA include its rules against paying student-athletes, limiting pay 
for coaches, measuring academic eligibility requirements in the form of 
standardized testing and high school curriculum, and using amateur-
ism as a guise for commercialism in college sports.51 
 Notwithstanding the criticism it has received, the NCAA serves a 
vital role in its responsibility for establishing and enforcing rules for 
amateurism, fair competition, and student-athlete protection among all 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Fitt, supra note 46, at 563 (describing, for example, NCAA regulations that re-
strict student-athletes in employment, outside income, and require consent to waive fed-
eral educational privacy laws, drug testing, and publicity rights). 
50 See, e.g., Beth A. Cianfrone & Thomas A. Baker III, The Use of Student-Athlete Likenesses 
in Sport Video Games: An Application of the Right of Publicity, 20 J. Legal Aspects Sport 35, 
35–36 (2010) (describing student-athletes’ ability to sue videogame producers and the 
NCAA, alleging violation of their rights to publicity); T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. 
NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil of Amateurism,” 35 U. Dayton L. 
Rev. 175, 177–79 (2010) (discussing a student-athlete’s challenge to an NCAA bylaw that 
prohibits student-athletes from having a lawyer present when negotiating a potential con-
tract with a professional organization while still playing at the collegiate level); Potuto, 
supra note 6, at 264 (describing various lawsuits against the NCAA brought by student-
athletes). See generally Doug Bakker, NCAA Initial Eligibility Requirements: The Case Law Behind 
the Changes, 3 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 160, 178 (2006) (discussing chal-
lenges from student-athletes regarding the NCAA’s initial eligibility requirements); Chris-
tian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-In-Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 
Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 97, 124 (2007) (discussing White v. NCAA and student-athletes’ chal-
lenges to the cap on athletics-based financial aid); Andrew M. Habenicht, Has the Shot Clock 
Expired? Pryor v. NCAA and the Premature Disposal of a “Deliberate Indifference” Discrimination 
Claim Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 551, 557 (2003) 
(discussing civil rights laws and the NCAA, particularly the impact of freshman academic 
eligibility rules the NCAA has promulgated since 1986); Diane Heckman, Tracking Chal-
lenges to NCAA’s Academic Eligibility Requirements Based on Race and Disability, 222 Educ. L. 
Rep. 1, 9 (2007) (discussing challenges to the NCAA’s academic eligibility requirements); 
Yuri Nicholas Walker, Playing the Game of Academic Integrity vs. Athletic Success: The Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Intercollegiate Student-Athletes with Learning Disabilities, 15 Marq. 
Sports L. Rev. 601, 640–41 (2005) (discussing the legal and ethical responsibility of the 
NCAA to accommodate student-athletes with learning disabilities); NCPA Wins Victories for 
College Athletes, Nat’l C. Players Ass’n (March 13, 2009), http://ncpanow.articulatedman. 
com/news_articles?id=0003 (listing how the NCPA has pressured the NCAA to change its 
policies). 
51 See generally Dennie, supra note 50; Mark Jenkins, The United Student-Athletes of Amer-
ica: Should College Athletes Organize in Order to Protect Their Rights and Address the Ills of Intercol-
legiate Athletics?, 5 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 39 (2004); Lockhart, supra note 50; Symposium, 
supra note 47. 
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member institutions.52 Fundamentally, each member institution is re-
sponsible for ensuring compliance with NCAA regulations and for self-
reporting violations to the NCAA.53 Despite the rule entrusting com-
petitors to self-report violations, the membership has, not surprisingly, 
provided for a formal process charging the professional enforcement 
staff within the NCAA to formally investigate allegations of rule viola-
tions and to enforce appropriate penalties.54 Institutional members and 
representatives have a responsibility to “cooperate fully with the NCAA 
enforcement staff, COI, Infractions Appeals Committee, and Board of 
Directors to further the objectives of the Association and its enforce-
ment program.”55 Institutions are expected to provide full disclosure of 
any relevant information requested by the enforcement staff.56 Accord-
ing to NCAA bylaws, the penalties imposed “should be broad and se-
vere if the violation or violations reflect a general disregard for the gov-
erning rules.”57 
 The COI conducts a hearing similar to an arbitration process in 
which the enforcement staff, institution, and involved individuals may 
present witnesses, transcripts of interviews, summaries of interviews, 
and other evidence gathered.58 The COI has authority to request that 
specific institutional individuals appear at the hearing, including the 
institution’s president, head coach of the sport in question, the athlet-
ics director, legal counsel, and the current student-athlete whose eligi-
bility may be affected.59 The hearings typically last a full day or more in 
                                                                                                                      
52 The rules governing NCAA member institutions’ athletic programs are codified in 
the NCAA Manual, which contains the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws. See NCAA Const., 
supra note 11, arts. 5.1.1, 5.01.1 (“All legislation of the [NCAA] that governs the conduct 
of the intercollegiate athletics programs of its member institutions shall be adopted by the 
membership in Convention assembled, or by the divisional governance structures as set 
forth in Constitution 4 . . . .”). 
53 Id. art. 2.1 (“It is the responsibility of each member institution to control its intercol-
legiate athletics program in compliance with the rules and regulations of the [NCAA].”). 
54 See Enforcement Process, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/ 
issues/enforcement (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
55 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 19.01.3 (Responsibility to Cooper-
ate). 
56 See id. art. 32.3.7.2 (Responsibility to Cooperate). 
57 Id. art. 19.01.5. 
58 Id. art. 32.8.7. Hearing procedures include opening and closing statements, and the 
enforcement staff, institution, and any involved individuals are afforded the opportunity to 
present information relating to the alleged violations. Id. The COI may question represen-
tatives during the hearing. Id. art. 32.8.7.6. The hearings are recorded and a transcript is 
produced for appealed cases. Id. art. 32. 8.7.7. 
59 Id. art. 32.8.6 (Appearance of Individuals at Hearings). 
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rare cases.60 Upon adjournment of the hearing, the COI deliberates 
and issues a case report announcing its factual findings regarding each 
allegation of NCAA major violations and the attendant penalties.61 The 
case report, which redacts names of the involved individuals, is released 
to the media, although the institution is provided an advance copy of 
the case report prior to release.62 The case involving USC serves as an 
example of how the NCAA through the COI addresses misconduct. 
II. The Impacts of NCAA Sanctions 
 Sanctions resulting from a major violation are serious and have a 
detrimental practical effect, at least in the short term, on the involved 
program and its participants.63 The stigma of a major violation also 
chills recruiting, as high school students are justifiably wary of commit-
ting to a school that is on probation. Even probation stings, as it sub-
jects schools to the risk of repeat violator status. 
 But the sanctions’ reach is both overly limited and overly broad. 
NCAA sanction powers extend only to member institutions, not to indi-
vidual coaches, players, agents, boosters, or involved individuals who 
are not direct members of the NCAA.64 Member institutions contract to 
abide by NCAA rules as a condition of membership. Technically the 
NCAA does not contract with coaches or players, but those individuals 
generally must agree to comply with NCAA regulations through con-
tractual arrangements with the member school.65 The NCAA may indi-
rectly sanction individuals, such as coaches or athletic personnel, 
through a penalty requiring the institution to take employment action 
against employed individuals or to disassociate with non-employed in-
dividuals. Rarely, however, does the NCAA issue financial sanctions that 
                                                                                                                      
60 The USC infractions hearing lasted three days. Pete Thamel, N.C.A.A. Ends Hearing 
About U.S.C. Infractions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2010, at SP12. 
61 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 32.8.8 (Posthearing Committee 
Deliberations). 
62 Id. art. 32.9.2 (Release to Media). 
63 See, e.g., Zach Rosenfield, History Says USC in for Long Downturn, ESPNLosAngeles. 
com, http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/columns/story?id=5319505 (last updated June 
23, 2010) (“The facts are plain: The sanctions USC now must live through are a one-way tick-
et to six years of mediocrity and instability.”). 
64 See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 196 (1988) (holding that the decision to 
fire a coach for an NCAA violation was by the university). 
65 See id. 
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require disgorgement of the profits associated with the program in vio-
lation.66 
 More problematically, the reach of the sanctions has ripple effects 
that impair uninvolved programs and innocent student-athletes, both 
financially and with respect to playing opportunities. 67 Current students 
recruited and lured by the pretense of a successful program remain on 
the team but are limited in their prospects for competition or transfer.68 
A. The Unintended Impact of Sanctions? 
1. New Recruits and Current Student-Athletes Suffer 
 Among the arguably unintended and unarguably unwarranted 
consequences of NCAA sanctions include attacks on new recruits and 
student-athletes. NCAA sanction rules state that “[a]n important con-
sideration in imposing penalties is to provide fairness to uninvolved 
student-athletes, coaches, administrators, competitors and other institu-
tions.”69 But sanctions redressing past misconduct undeniably impact 
many who were not involved in the rules infraction or misconduct, or 
who did not even attend the violating institution (as they were likely 
still in high school). As the new USC football coach stated in reference 
to the NCAA penalties, “[t]his has nothing to do with this team . . . [or] 
the direction of the program. . . . That’s the past; obviously we’re suffer-
ing from it.”70 
 Current players are directly impacted by the sanctions imposed on 
the programs for past misconduct, and NCAA bylaws restrict students’ 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Chris DuFresne, Reggie Bush Still Can’t Say the Magic Word—Sorry, L.A. Times, 
Sept. 14, 2010, at C1 (noting that, in connection with Bush’s return of the Heisman, “USC 
immediately distanced itself from Bush, sent its copy of the Heisman Trophy back and 
removed his name from the record books”). USC officials called for Reggie Bush to return 
his Heisman Trophy but USC’s own return of certain profits gained during Bush’s tenure 
was self imposed. NCAA Delivers Postseason Football Ban, ESPNLosAngeles.com, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615 (last updated June 11, 2010). 
One reporter also notes that “[Bush] ultimately got rich and earned a Super Bowl ring 
while leaving USC on probation, with innocent players paying for his sins with a two-year 
bowl ban.” DuFresne, supra. 
67 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 19.01.1. 
68 See id. art. 14.6. 
69 See id. art. 19.01.1. 
70 See Reggie Bush to Forfeit Heisman, ESPNLosAngeles.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5572827 (last updated Sept. 15, 2010); see also David Whar-
ton, Bush Forfeits Heisman Trophy, L.A. Times, Sept. 15, 2010, at A1, available at http://art- 
icles.latimes.com/2010/sep/14/sports/la-sp-reggie-bush-20100915. 
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ability to transfer to another institution without sitting out one year.71 
The one-time transfer exception does not apply uniformly to student-
athletes in all sports.72 The NCAA bylaws provide for a potential waiver 
of the one-year sit-out transfer rule for student-athletes whose original 
institution is banned from postseason play, but only where the sanctions 
would preclude that student from “[p]articipating in postseason com-
petition during all of the remaining seasons of the student-athlete’s eli-
gibility.”73 Thus, where a school is assessed a one-year postseason ban, 
only incoming seniors may transfer; and where the institution is under 
a two-year postseason ban, only incoming junior or seniors may trans-
fer. And where the institution appeals the sanctions, uncertainty looms 
for months.74 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 See NCAA Operating Bylaws supra note 14, art. 14.6. 
72 See id. art. 14.5.5.2.10 (One-Time Transfer Exception). One of the requirements of 
the exception reads: 
The student is a participant in a sport other than baseball, basketball, bowl 
subdivision football or men’s ice hockey at the institution to which the stu-
dent is transferring. A participant in championship subdivision football at the 
institution to which the student is transferring may use this exception only if 
the participant transferred to the certifying institution from an institution 
that sponsors bowl subdivision football and has two or more seasons of com-
petition remaining in football or the participant transfers from a Football 
Championship Subdivision institution that offers athletically related financial 
aid in football to a Football Championship Subdivision institution that does 
not offer athletically related financial aid in football. 
Id. art. 14.5.5.2.10(a). Apparently, this rule authorizes a one-time exception to the transfer 
rule for student-athletes who transfer from a bowl subdivision school (formerly Division I-
A) to a championship subdivision school (formerly Division I-AA) or to a program that 
does not offer athletic aid. Athletes under this exception would transfer to a smaller ath-
letic program than their original institution. This would not enable athletes to transfer, 
without penalty, to any school of their choice. See id. 
73 Id. art. 14.8.2(c) (emphasis added). The Bylaw provides that: 
On the recommendation of the Committee on Infractions, for a student-
athlete who transfers to a member institution to continue the student-
athlete’s opportunity for full participation in a sport because the student-
athlete’s original institution was placed on probation by the NCAA with sanc-
tions that would preclude the institution’s team in that sport from participat-
ing in postseason competition during all of the remaining seasons of the stu-
dent-athlete’s eligibility. 
Id. 
74 For example, the hearing from USC’s appeal occurred over six months from the 
COI sanctions report date, and the IAC hearing itself occurred January 22, 2011. Practi-
cally, the athletes have to make decisions to stay or transfer under this uncertainty. Bill N., 
USC Football: Trojans Win NCAA Appeal and Remaining Sanctions Canceled, Bleacher Rep. 
( Jan. 30, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/590217-usc-football-trojans-win-ncaa-
appeal-and-remaining-football-sanctions-cancelled (“USC received . . . sanctions . . . on 
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 In 2010, the NCAA sanctioned USC for lack of institutional con-
trol.75 After a four-year investigation, the NCAA promulgated a report 
that exposed myriad illicit benefits given to Reggie Bush and basketball 
player O.J. Mayo.76 In the USC case, five student-athletes did transfer 
upon issuance of the NCAA sanctions on the USC basketball and foot-
ball programs, which included bans on postseason play.77 But the re-
lease from the transfer rule was limited to juniors and seniors.78 To its 
credit, USC exercised its discretion to release certain recruits from 
their letter of intent.79 Otherwise, generally, new recruits and sopho-
mores at a school under major penalty are not free to transfer.80 USC’s 
                                                                                                                      
June 10, 2010. . . . USC quickly appealed some of the football sanctions and presented 
their case to the NCAA Infractions Appeals Committee (IAC) on [January 22, 2011].”). 
75 See Greg Beacham, NCAA Drops the Hammer on USC Football, NBC Sports, http://nbc 
sports.msnbc.com/id/37621070/ns/sports-college_football/ (last updated June 10, 2010). 
76 See USC Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 4–6. 
77 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art 14.8.2(c). The Bylaws provide: 
On the recommendation of the Committee on Infractions, for a student-athlete 
who transfers to a member institution to continue the student-athlete’s oppor-
tunity for full participation in a sport because the student-athlete’s original insti-
tution was placed on probation by the NCAA with sanctions that would pre-
clude the institution’s team in that sport from participating in postseason play 
during all of the remaining seasons of the student-athlete’s eligibility. 
Id. art. 13.1.1.3.3 (Transfer from Institution Placed on Probation by Committee on Infrac-
tions) (authorizing recruitment of student-athletes at an institution under sanction and 
restricted from postseason competition but requiring notice). 
78 See supra note 72 (discussing the One-Time Transfer Exception). 
79 See Cash Bounties Reported at Miami, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1994, http://www.nytimes. 
com/1994/05/21/sports/sports-people-football-cash-bounties-reported-at-miami.html (re- 
porting that football players at the University of Miami were paid for making big plays in 
football games as part of a program nicknamed “pay-for-play”). While USC was under in-
vestigation, it continued to recruit, although prospective student-athletes could not then 
know the case outcome or effect of sanctions. See Joe Schad, USC Releasing Recruit Hender-
son, ESPNLosAngeles.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id= 
5358730 (last updated July 6, 2010). For instance, Seantrel Henderson, widely reported as 
the most sought-after prospective football student-athlete in the nation in 2009, signed 
with USC while its NCAA infractions case was pending. See id. Henderson did so reportedly 
based upon representations from USC head football coach Lane Kiffin that any sanctions 
imposed by the COI would be minimal. As it turns out, there would have been no oppor-
tunity to travel to and participate in a bowl game had Seantrel been forced to attend USC. 
See id. USC released Seantrel from his commitment, and he ultimately chose to attend the 
University of Miami, itself a school with a history of NCAA major infractions. See id.; see also 
Open Letter from Alexander Wolff, to Edward T. (Tad) Foote II, President, Univ. of Miami 
( June 12, 1995), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 
1006688/1/index.htm (describing the University of Miami’s “Pell Grant Scandal,” which 
implicated fifty-seven student-athletes and was described as “perhaps the largest centralized 
fraud upon the federal Pell Grant program ever committed”). 
80 See supra note 72 (discussing the One-Time Transfer Exception). 
568 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:551 
appeal of the sanctions issued in the COI June report remained pend-
ing well into the following season.81 
2. Financial Impacts on Conference Schools 
 Sanctions also impact other institutions, notably fellow conference 
members. For instance, most conferences distribute revenue from televi-
sion rights fees, bowl appearances, and Final Four participation among 
conference members.82 Sanctions imposed on the offending school may 
decrease revenue that the school may have generated for the conference, 
and other members of that conference receive lesser distributions of 
conference revenue.83 
B. Violators Escape Punishment 
1. Limited Impact on Actual Violators 
 Although student-athletes and conference schools may be nega-
tively impacted by NCAA sanctions, the current sanctions inadequately 
motivate head coaches to supervise compliance within their programs. 
Indeed, many coaches of problem programs are able to escape penal-
ties and move on.84 An apparent trend has emerged at elite levels of 
NCAA sports, in particular men’s basketball, where highly successful 
coaches leave NCAA-sanctioned programs for new, and perhaps more 
                                                                                                                      
81 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
82 See Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Business of Sports 516 
(2004) (noting that each conference is allowed to develop its own formula to distribute 
revenue among member institutions.) 
83 For example, the University of California at Berkeley recently abandoned its storied 
men’s baseball program due to a lack of funding, effective fall 2011. Press Release, UC Berke-
ley, Three UC Berkeley Athletic Teams to Be Preserved (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http:// 
newscenter.berkeley.edu/2011/02/11/athletics-continuation/ (explaining that, although 
philanthropic funding was available to save women’s lacrosse, women’s gymnastics, and 
rugby, men’s gymnastics and baseball would be cut). It has been reported that revenue lost 
by the Pac-10 Conference, due to recent sanctions against USC, the University of Arizona, 
and Arizona State University, has contributed to this unfortunate downsizing. See id.; Jason 
Figueiredo-Dumpit, Cause & Effect: Possible Ripples from NCAA Sanctions on USC, Bleacher 
Rep. (Feb. 15, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/345997-cause-effect-possible-ripples- 
from-ncaas-sanctions-on-usc (“This severe sanction would also hit the Pac-10 where it hurts 
the most . . . their pocket book.”). Similarly, commentators attribute the “death penalty” 
sanction against Southern Methodist University to the demise of the old Southwest Con-
ference. See John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Contro-
versy 372 (2000) (noting that the Southwest Conference dissolved because scandals and 
NCAA penalties interfered with television profits.). 
84 See infra notes 111–123 and accompanying text. 
2011] NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs 569 
lucrative, positions. One example is the high-profile basketball coach 
John Calipari, former head coach of the University of Memphis, the 
University of Massachusetts, and the National Basketball Association’s 
(NBA) New Jersey Nets.85 Coach Calipari is one of only four coaches to 
direct two different colleges to a number one seed in the NCAA Tour-
nament, and the only head coach to have a Final Four appearance va-
cated at more than one school.86 Although the two programs that 
Calipari guided to the Final Four were sanctioned and had their re-
cords vacated, he escaped any personal sanctions.87 Now at the Univer-
sity of Kentucky, he is the highest paid coach in the NCAA and again 
finds himself on the periphery of NCAA scandal.88 
 Kelvin Sampson, former head men’s basketball coach at Oklahoma 
and the storied Indiana program, also was able to leave behind an insti-
tution amid NCAA sanctions, yet advance to a pay raise at a new NCAA 
school.89 During Sampson’s tenure, Oklahoma was under NCAA inves-
tigation for recruiting violations; the NCAA concluded that more than 
550 illegal calls were made by Sampson and his staff to seventeen differ-
ent recruits.90 The NCAA sanctions on Oklahoma barred Sampson 
from recruiting off campus and making phone calls for one year, end-
                                                                                                                      
85 See John Calipari Profile, U. Ky. Official Athletic Site, http://www.ukathletics. 
com/sports/m-baskbl/mtt/calipari_john00.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). Calipari was 
the head coach of University of Massachusetts from 1989 to 1996. Id. Calipari next served 
as head coach of the New Jersey Nets from 1997 until 1999, before he became the head 
coach of the University of Memphis from 2001 to 2009. Id. Calipari is currently the head 
coach at the University of Kentucky. Id. 
86 E.g., Michael Rosenberg, Refuse to Lose: Master Salesman Calipari Is the Best at What He 
Does, SI.com (Mar. 17, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_rosen 
berg/03/17/calipari/index.html. At press time, a Calipari team was again set to play in the 
Final Four. Ian O’Connor, Coach Cal’s Third Final Four Is His First, ESPNNewYork.com, http: 
//sports.espn.go.com/new-york/ncb/columns/story?columnist=oconnor_ian&id=6265157 
(last updated Mar. 29, 2011). 
87 Letter from Paul T. Dee, Dir., NCAA Div. I Comm. on Infractions, to John Calipari, 
Head Men’s Basketball Coach, Univ. of Ky. (May 21 2009), available at http://www.courier-
journal.com/assets/B2135763529.PDF (“As stated in Mr. Cooper’s letter, you are not al-
leged to have committed NCAA violations and thus are not considered to be ‘at risk’ in 
these proceedings.”). 
88 Calipari recruited Enes Kanter from a preparatory school in Simi Valley, California. 
In November, 2010, the NCAA ruled Kanter ineligible for having received over $33,000 in 
extra benefits. See Kentucky’s Enes Kanter Ruled Ineligible, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
ncb/news/story?id=5793192 (last updated Nov. 12, 2010). 
89 See NCAA Lists 5 Major Violations; IU AD ‘Profoundly Disappointed,’ ESPN, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=3243793 (last updated Feb. 15, 2008). 
90 Could LeBron James Next Head Coach Be Former Sooner Kelvin Sampson?, examiner.com 
Oklahoma City (May 28, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/oklahoma-sooners-in-oklahoma- 
city/could-lebron-james-next-head-coach-be-former-sooner-kelvin-sampson (“The NCAA 
found Sampson and his staff made more than 550 illegal calls to 17 different recruits.”). 
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ing May 24, 2007.91 While under NCAA investigation at Oklahoma, 
Sampson was hired by the University of Indiana with a substantial pay 
raise.92 Months later and while subject to restrictions from making out-
bound recruiting phone calls, Sampson participated in calls with re-
cruits at Indiana.93 The NCAA alleged that Sampson knowingly violated 
telephone recruiting restrictions imposed on him and also alleged that 
Sampson misrepresented to Indiana University and NCAA officials re-
garding his involvement in the impermissible calls.94 On November 25, 
2008, the NCAA ordered against Indiana a three-year probation term 
for violations largely tied to Sampson’s tenure. It also imposed a five-year 
show-cause order on Sampson, meaning that no NCAA member school 
would be able to hire Sampson without demonstrating to the NCAA that 
Sampson has served his punishment.95 
 The Sampson and Calipari cases demonstrate the problem of 
coaches being able to leave a university athletic program in shambles, 
yet upgrade personally to a position at another institution. Consider 
former head football coach Pete Carroll, who left to coach in the NFL 
and is making millions of dollars there (although he made four million 
dollars per year at USC).96 This also shows the win-at-all-costs mentality 
                                                                                                                      
 
91 Prior to this incident, Kelvin Sampson was the President of the National Association 
of Basketball Coaches (NABC), an organization that supports basketball coaches across the 
country. Andy Katz, Sampson Receives NCAA’s Harshest Penalty, ESPN, http://sports.espn. 
go.com/ncb/news/story?id=3725832 (last updated Nov. 25, 2008). While in this position, 
the NABC formed an ethics committee to deal with a myriad of recruiting issues in men’s 
collegiate basketball. NABC Ethics Committee Reprimands Coach Kelvin Sampson, Nat’l Ass’n 
Basketball Coaches (Aug. 15, 2006), http://www.nabc.org/sports/m-baskbl/spec-rel/ 
081506aaa.html. Ironically, this very ethics committee would later reprimand Sampson as a 
result of the NCAA findings, placing him on probation for three years and declaring that 
he would not be eligible to serve in any official capacity for the NABC, be considered for 
Coach of the Year honors, or receive Final Four ticket privileges. See id. 
92 See NCAA Lists 5 Major Violations; IU AD ‘Profoundly Disappointed,’ supra note 89 (re-
porting that Indiana hired Sampson in April 2006 with an annual base salary of $500,000). 
93 Indiana Dealing with Sampson Allegations, AccessNorthGa.com (Feb. 14, 2008), http:// 
www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=206960&c=5 (“[L]ess than two months after Sampson 
took the Indiana job . . . the Sooners coaches made 577 illegal calls between 2000 and 2004. 
The NCAA banned Sampson from calling recruits and making off-campus visits for a year.”). 
94 See Sampson, IU Part Ways After Buyout, News 5 WLWT.com (Feb. 22, 2008), http:// 
www.wlwt.com/r/15377934/detail.html. 
95 See Katz, supra note 91; see also Seth Davis, End of a Sad Saga: IU Had Few Good Options 
in Getting Rid of Sampson, SI.com (Feb. 22, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/ 
writers/seth_davis/02/22/kelvin.sampson/index.html (implying that Indiana officials had 
already decided Sampson was guilty, based on the fact that its internal investigation would 
last only a week). 
96 See Gary Klein, Carroll of USC Tops Salary List, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 2009, at D3, available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/23/sports/sp-college-salaries23; Gary Klein & Sam 
Farmer, Carroll Takes Seattle Job: USC Players Are Told By Text, L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 2010, at C1, 
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of some institutions that hire a coach known to have violated NCAA 
rules and whose program at a previous institution is subjected to major 
NCAA bylaw violations. The process is flawed where innocent student-
athletes who remain at a sanctioned program are penalized, but the re-
sponsible coach is permitted to retain bonuses for “winning” and is 
hired by a member institution willing to take the risk in the desire to 
win. 
2. The One-and-Done Problem and Involved Athletes Turning Pro 
 As with coaches who can leave a program, often times the student-
athletes involved in the offending conduct are able to leave the sanc-
tioned program far behind. A particular rule from the NBA, that opens 
draft eligibility to players one year out of high school, has a detrimental 
impact on the discipline and enforcement aspects of college basketball 
programs.97 Under this “one and done” system, elite college men’s bas-
ketball players may leave for the NBA after one year out of high school. 
O.J. Mayo was thus unscathed in his NBA berth, although he violated 
NCAA rules while at USC and left behind a program and teammates hit 
by the sanctions. Unfortunately, the cases of coaches and star student-
athletes able to evade sanction are not isolated.98 
                                                                                                                      
 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/11/sports/la-sp-carroll11–2010jan11 (re-
porting that Carroll’s five-year contract with the Seattle Seahawks is worth an estimated $33 
million); Danny O’Neil, Pete Carroll Among Country’s Highest Paid Coaches, Seattle Times Sea-
hawks Blog (May 24, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/seahawks 
blog/2011941825_pete_carroll_am.html (reporting that Carroll is the third highest paid 
football coach in the country with his $7 million salary). 
97 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement art. X (2005) (Player Eligibility and 
NBA Draft), available at http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf; see 
also Roscoe Nance, Teen Draftees Grounded Until 19 Under New Deal, USA Today, June 21, 
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2005-06-21-teens-cba_x.htm. Be-
ginning in 2005, the NBA required new draftees to be either nineteen years old, or have 
completed one year of college. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra, art. X; 
Nance, supra. This rule was given the nickname “one and done,” because athletes would 
spend one year in college before bolting for the NBA. See Michael Lee, Debate Flares over 
‘One-and-Done’ Rule, Wash. Post, June 24, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ 
content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062302079.html. 
98 For example, the New York Times recently reported that Eric Bledsoe, a star point 
guard who lacked the grades to meet the NCAA’s minimum standards, enrolled in A. H. 
Parker High School, where his grades increased. Pete Thamel & Thayer Evans, N.C.A.A. Is 
Looking into Former Kentucky Player, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2010, at D1, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/05/29/sports/ncaabasketball/29recruit.html. After one season at the 
University of Kentucky, Bledsoe awaits a lucrative payday in the upcoming NBA draft. See id. 
The changes in Bledsoe’s academic and athletic prospects have prompted an NCAA investi-
gation in Alabama. See id. These allegations are strikingly similar to the violations at the Uni-
versity of Memphis, where the star guard Derrick Rose (now an NBA star) had his SAT test 
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 The incentives for these star athletes to comply with NCAA rules to 
preserve eligibility are not insubstantial; yet, the NCAA’s report in the 
USC case suggests that institutions have a higher responsibility to moni-
tor their star athletes.99 The COI report, issued by the NCAA, states: 
Universities may not hide their heads in the sand and purport 
to treat all programs and student-athletes similarly when it 
comes to the level of scrutiny required. The more potential 
there is for big payoffs to student-athletes once they turn pro-
fessional, then the more potential there is for illicit agent and 
third party involvement in the provision of significant cash 
and other benefits. In turn, heightened scrutiny is re-
quired.100 
Although this proposition is not the basis of a specific provision in 
NCAA bylaws and neither the NCAA nor member schools can restrict a 
student-athlete opting to leave school for professional play, the likeli-
hood these star athletes may be sought after by agents and offered ex-
tra benefits is obvious. The appreciation for the value star athletes bring 
to a collegiate program should not overtake the risks to the school and 
to other players where the institution enables or fails to monitor. 
. A
efits to student-athletes.103 Despite laws intended to address agent 
3 gents Unscathed 
 NCAA bylaws render ineligible any student-athlete who has agreed 
to be represented by an agent or who accepts, directly or indirectly, 
transportation or other benefits from prospective agents.101 The rule 
applies not only to registered agents, but includes “street agents,” “re-
cruiters,” and “runners” for an agent.102 Federal and some state legisla-
tion restrict agents from recruiting, soliciting, and giving improper ben-
                                                                                                                      
scores invalidated, resulting in the sanctions that caused Memphis to vacate its Final Four 
appearance and seriously impacted the current student-athletes at Memphis. See Derrick Rose’s 
SAT Huffington Post (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http: oses-sat-scores-_0_n_510309.html. 
pra note 16, at 3. 
.1 (General Rule), 12.3.1.2 
(Be
 
 Scores Wipe out Memphis’ Record 38-Win Season, 
//www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/23/derrick-r
99 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
100 USC Infractions Report, su
101 NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, arts. 12.3
nefits from Prospective Agents). 
102 USC Infractions Report, supra note 16, at 11. 
103 See, e.g., Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. § 7801 (2006) 
(addressing agent contact with student-athletes); Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA), 15 
U.S.C. § 7807 (2006) (focusing on agent practices in recruiting student-athletes). According 
to NCAA.com, the UAAA is a “model state law that [regulates] the conduct of athlete agents. 
2011] NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs 573 
solicitation of student-athletes, the problem persists because some 
agents are able to disclaim knowledge and circumvent the rules through 
the use of runners or middlemen. Ultimately, cooperation by the pro-
fessional leagues and player unions to refuse to certify or work with such 
agents is needed. 
4. Involved High School or AAU Coaches 
 Other individuals and representatives who operate outside the 
NCAA’s regulatory reach, or outside of the member institutions them-
selves, include the highly influential roles of high school coaches, 
summer league AAU coaches, and athletic shoe company representa-
tives at the high school level. Top Division I basketball prospects play in 
summer leagues, which are a showcase for collegiate recruiting.104 In 
close association with the young athletes, these coaches are in a posi-
tion, known by recruiters, to influence a player’s selection of schools. 
NCAA rules prohibit paying AAU coaches.105 And yet although a pen-
alty ensues against the NCAA coach and member school if payment is 
made to an AAU coach, the AAU coach is able to keep the money and 
stay in business.106 
III. Postgame Analysis and Proposals for Tailored Penalties 
and Improved Compliance 
 Sanctions are undeniably required to address major rule infractions 
by member institutions. As the foregoing discussion suggests, however, 
current sanctions may unfairly impact innocent student-athletes and 
also fail to address problematic conduct of the involved coaches, agents, 
                                                                                                                      
. . . [Generally] the UAAA . . . requires an athlete agent to register with a state authority. . . . 
[I]n order to act as an athlete agent in that state . . . an athlete agent must provide . . . back-
ground information, both professional and criminal in nature.” FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agents 
Act, NCAA ( July 29, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Re- 
sources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/July+latest+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+Athlete 
+Agents+Act. Moreover, as of July 2010, “the UAAA has been passed in 40 states, the District 
of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.” Id. For an example, see Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents 
Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18895 (West 2010). 
104 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
105 NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 11.4 (Employment of High School, 
Prepatory School, or Two-Year College Coaches, or Other Individuals Associated with Pro-
spective Student-Athletes). 
106 See Eric Prisbell & Steve Yanda, A Whole New Ballgame That Williams Won’t Play, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 
02/12/AR2009021202299.html (arguing that the NCAA should either ban or reduce the 
ability of NCAA coaches to recruit at AAU summer camps). 
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players, and representatives out of reach of NCAA regulation. The fol-
lowing sanctions proposals are intended to better align penalties with 
misconduct, thus better reflecting the underlying purposes of sanctions. 
her 
administrative compliance programs.109 But is there a better way?110 
                                                                                                                     
A. Are the Current Sanctions Alright? 
 Do current sanction policies in sport adequately achieve the objec-
tives of deterrence, punishment, and the NCAA’s policies for protect-
ing student-athletes and the integrity of intercollegiate athletics? Pro-
fessor Gene Marsh, who served on the COI for nine years, questions 
whether the current sanctioning process effectively deters violations.107 
Marsh writes that the NCAA enforcement process is “[n]o better or 
worse [as a deterrent] than the [Internal Revenue Service] is [as] a de-
terrent to tax cheating or the Securities and Exchange Commission is 
to securities fraud.”108 He also suggests that the lack of subpoena power 
in the NCAA enforcement processes renders it less effective than ot
B. Proposals for Improving the Sanctioning Process and Penalties 
 The current sanctions system insufficiently deters or penalizes 
those responsible for violations, and at the same time unfairly impacts 
 
107 See Gene A. Marsh, A Call for Dissent and Further Independence in the NCAA Infractions 
Process, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 695, 697 (2009) (“I question the deterrent effect of 
the penalties self-imposed by the institutions and those additional penalties imposed by 
the Committee [on Infractions].”). 
108 Id. at 697. Marsh opines that the NCAA process 
[s]cares some people and they act better because of it. But there’s a full boat-
load of people not affected at all. They weigh what they stand to gain vs. what 
they lose if they get caught and decide to go on and do what they do. . . . If 
people were really scared of the infractions process, we wouldn’t have so many 
repeat cases. In nine years on the committee, we’ve had (programs) in front of 
us again before the ink is dry on the last opinion (ruling against them). 
Id. at 697 n.5. 
109 See id. at 697. 
110 See id. at 697 n.6. On June 17, 2008, a panel on “NCAA Infractions: An Examination of 
Trends, Recommendations to Restructure Penalties and Challenges,” convened at a meeting 
of the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. See id. (noting that al-
though university presidents publicly call for more strict penalties, most “[s]ing an entirely 
different tune before the Committee and in their public announcements of appeal from the 
penalties imposed by the Committee”). For more information, see NCAA Infractions: An Ex-
amination of Trends, Recommendations to Restructure Penalties, and Challenges ( June 19, 2008) 
(downloaded using iTunes). See generally Knight Comm’n on Intercollegiate Athletics, 
A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education (2001), avail-
able at http://www.knightcommission.org/images/pdfs/2001_knight_report.pdf. 
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innocent and uninvolved parties, typically student-athletes who were 
not on campus when violations occurred. Perhaps this is an unavoid-
able circumstance, given the limited regulatory reach of the NCAA to 
institutional members. But consider options for improvement. Is it just 
a matter of institutions needing to do a better job of screening coaches 
and athletic department personnel? Do the existing sanctions need to 
be applied more severely? Can the existing sanctions be applied in a 
tailored manner to avoid unnecessarily punishing innocent student-
athletes? Or is the answer to completely revamp the entire infractions 
enforcement and sanctions landscape? Perhaps, the answer lies some-
where in the middle. This Section offers four proposals for considera-
tion. 
. H1 old Head Coaches Financially Accountable for Program Violations 
 NCAA regulations hold university presidents ultimately responsible 
for the institutions’ compliance with NCAA regulations.111 Institutional 
control is certainly a bedrock principle of NCAA membership.112 Real-
istically, ensuring compliance with all of the NCAA regulations is an 
overwhelming task. As this Article certainly recognizes, an NCAA com-
pliance officer may have “the toughest job in college sports.”113 In this 
environment, the head coach of an athletic program is in the best posi-
tion to monitor his or her program as well as to infuse ethical standards 
of integrity and compliance among the coaching staff, players, and rep-
resentatives.114 Head coaches in major sport programs, such as football 
or basketball, are highly compensated, and in some instances paid 
more than the university president and even the highest paid public 
                                                                                                                      
111 See NCAA Const., supra note 11, art. 6.1.1 (“A member institution’s president or 
cha thority for the conduct of the intercolle-
giat
s: NCAA Compliance Officer May Be the Toughest Job in 
Coll
thletic 
and
ncellor has ultimate responsibility and final au
e athletics program and the actions of any board in control of that program.”). 
112 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
113 Seth Wickersham, Internal Affair
ege Sports, ESPN insider, http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/insider/news/story?id= 
5455740 (last updated Aug. 17, 2010). 
114 See Knight Comm’n on Intercollegiate Athletics, Restoring the Balance: 
Dollars, Values, and the Future of College Sports 3 (2010), available at http://www. 
knightcommission.org/images/restoringbalance/KCIA_Report_F.pdf (stating that the “rates 
of spending growth” in college sports are “breathtaking” and that this increase “threatens 
the continued vitality of athletics programs and the integrity of our universities. It cannot 
be maintained”). The Commission recommends, inter alia, greater transparency in a
 academic spending, rewarding practices that value academics, and treating college 
athletes as students first and foremost, rather than as professionals. See id. at 10–13. 
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official in the state.115 Money is power, and highly compensated head 
coaches have the power to enable, as well as to avoid, major violations 
 th
 may re-
lt 
compensation and bonuses to a violation-free program.119 Federal legis-
in eir programs. 
 As Wall Street is forced to better match executive compensation to 
risk and to the long-term health of the company,116 collegiate athletics 
should also try to better match compensation practices and risk taking. 
Coaches of revenue-generating sports at major institutions, like many 
financial executives and managers, are extremely well compensated.117 
They also have a certain incentive to take extreme risks which
su in personal benefit, yet place their employers in jeopardy. 
 The incentives for both the coach and institution to ensure long-
term compliance need to be better aligned. Current regulations are an 
insufficient mechanism to hold coaches responsible for the integrity of 
the program or actions of their subordinates.118 Collegiate institutions 
should better protect themselves from NCAA violations by tying coach 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Steve Wieberg et al., College Football Coaches See Salaries Rise in Down Economy, USA 
Today, November 10, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2009-11- 
09-c
Compensation/; Roger A. 
Lan
. 
pep
aches 
sho
 
oaches-salary-analysis_N.htm (noting that even the “salaries of assistant coaches . . . 
[are] approaching and even exceeding presidents’ compensation and most eclipsing that 
of full professors”). 
116 For instance, a significant portion of compensation may be held back from an indi-
vidual or paid in restricted stock, which may not be sold until some period of years later, 
until the company’s earnings have proven to be solid and not illusory based on risks that 
would not appear until later. If compensation is in restricted stock, which may not be sold 
until three to five years after the stock is issued, then the theory is that the executive’s in-
terests would be better aligned with the interests of long term investors in the company 
and the executive would have less incentive to take extreme risks for short term personal 
gain. For information on executive pay restrictions and claw back proposals, see Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 § 956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641 
(2006). See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions 
on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/TreasuryAnnouncesNewRestrictionsOnExecutive
e et al., Securities Litigation Alert: Dodd-Frank’s Mandatory Executive Compensation Clawback: 
A Practical Review and Assessment, Pepper Hamilton LLP (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www
perlaw.com/publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=1868. 
117 Stephen Smith, As NCAA Coaches Get Paid, Schools Pay Price, CBS News (Apr. 2, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-20001638-503983.html. 
118 See Roya R. Hekmat, Malpractice During Practice: Should NCAA Coaches Be Liable for 
Negligence?, 22 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 613, 620–21 (2002) (arguing that NCAA co
uld owe student-athletes a higher level of care); supra notes 84–96 and accompanying 
text (discussing instances of former head coaches who move on to lucrative contracts with 
new employers, although their former programs suffer major infraction sanctions). 
119 For example, universities could defer significant portions of a coach’s compensa-
tion until a period of years have passed without the coach’s previous athletic program be-
ing implicated in any major NCAA violations. See Knight Comm’n on Intercollegiate 
Athletics, supra note 114, at 18 (reporting that escalating coaches’ salaries are the single 
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lation in the financial industry now requires the Chief Executive Offi-
cer (CEO) to personally certify financial reports of public compa-
nies.120 Similarly, head coaches—CEOs of their teams—should be ac-
countable for their programs and violations that occur on their watch. 
 The NCAA has attempted to embrace this practice by adopting a 
bylaw that provides for a violation when head coaches fail to monitor 
their programs.121 Adding a financial consequence gives “teeth” to en-
forcement of this provision. The NCAA does not directly contract with 
the coaches, and antitrust considerations may preclude such NCAA 
legislation regarding coach compensation;122 institutions may, however, 
consider such “clawback” provisions in individual coach employment 
contracts.123 
2. Institutional Disgorgement of Winnings and Financial Penalties 
 NCAA leadership should make better use of existing sanctions, 
particularly financial penalties, while placing less emphasis on penalties 
that have a direct impact on uninvolved student-athletes. Universities 
benefit financially from winning programs in the major fan-interest 
                                                                                                                      
largest contributor to the “unsustainable growth” of athletics expenditures). Antitrust law 
constrains the NCAA’s efforts to limit coach salaries; individual programs can and should, 
however, consider coach compensation in context of institutional values. The Knight 
Commission counsels that institutions should not permit coaches and athletic staff 
members to have separate contracts with companies that award staff financially for 
merchandising deals; rather the contracts should be between the university and corporate 
sponsor. See id. 
120 See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) (requiring CEO 
certification of financial reports filed with the Securities Exchange Commission). 
121 NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 11.1.2.1 (“It shall be the responsibil-
ity of an institution’s head coach to promote an atmosphere for compliance within the 
program supervised by the coach and to monitor the activities regarding compliance of all 
assistant coaches and other administrators involved with the program who report directly 
or indirectly to the coach.”). 
122 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (compelling the NCAA to 
pay damages of $67 million for limiting the earnings of coaches, in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust and Clayton Acts). 
123 See Randy Youngman, NCAA Sanctions Need Adjustment, Orange County Register, 
June 11, 2010, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/ncaa-253107-coach-violations.html. One 
commentator also advocates that: 
[a]ny coach who is hired by a school should be required to sign an agreement 
in which he promises to report any violations of which he becomes aware or if 
hears of possible violations. If it is found that he knowingly violated this 
agreement, he will be required to pay back his salary. This certainly will make 
coaches more vigilant in following rules instead of looking the other way. 
Id. 
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sports, and the financial impact reaches much more than just the ath-
letic department. For example, from the beginning of the Pete Carroll 
era at USC until his final year, donations to the school’s endowment 
increased by 284%, and incoming freshman applications jumped by 
167%.124 Although USC called for Reggie Bush to give back his Heis-
an
s from the NCAA do not provide such an 
ce
 for the imposition of a financial 
penalty on wrongdoers.126 The financial penalty, however, has only re-
m , USC did not immediately offer to return any of the financial do-
nations or revenue obtained in connection with the years Bush helped 
bring the national championship to the school.125 
 With tremendous financial incentives to win, the temptation to 
hire a coach who may push the compliance envelope too far is signifi-
cant. There must be an equal or greater incentive for institutions not to 
cut corners by trading compliance for success in the competitive venue; 
relatively insignificant penaltie
in ntive. Schools may take risks in hiring a coach knowing of prior 
violations, calculating that the benefits of a winning program outweigh 
the penalties that may ensue. 
 Devising a financial penalty that truly gets the attention of deci-
sionmakers on campus, but does not unnecessarily harm uninvolved 
student-athletes or unduly punish fellow conference members, is admit-
tedly difficult. Perhaps the answer is already on the NCAA books. For 
example, Bylaw 19.5.2.2(f) provides
                                                                                                                      
124 See Klein, supra note 96 (reporting that donation and endowment income increased 
from $13.7 million in 2001–2002 to $39 million in 2009); see also Bruin Steve, Different Ver-
sion, B l (re-
portin ssion, 
U. S. sited 
Feb. 2 ns a 
year). 
at from 2005 to 2008, athletics spending increased at more 
, at 1. 
ruin Zone ( June 17, 1999), http://www.bruinzone.com/classics/0002.shtm
g that USC received 21,400 freshmen applications in 1998); Undergraduate Admi
Cal., http://www.usc.edu/admission/undergraduate/apply/index.html (last vi
7, 2011) (stating that USC currently receives over 35,000 freshmen applicatio
Alan Zagier observes about the Knight Commission report: 
The report notes th
han  ot  twice the rate f academic spending at nearly all of the 103 Football Bowl 
Subdivision schools. On average, FBS schools spend more than six times as 
uch on athletics per capita han om  t n academics. And most schools are forced to 
tap general university funds to balance their athletics budgets. 
Zagier, supra note 3
125 See sources cited supra note 1 (discussing donations that universities accrue as a re-
sult of successful athletics programs); supra note 66. 
126 NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 19.5.2.2(f) (listing a financial penalty 
among the range of disciplinary measures that may be imposed against an institution for a 
major violations). 
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ce ly been used, and then for relatively minor financial penalties, 
given the size of athletic budgets.
nt
127 
 Another option is a penalty structure for NCAA major infractions 
akin to the “luxury tax” in major league baseball.128 A schedule of pen-
alties can be based on total athletic department revenues (not ex-
penses), including donations by booster organizations, with the range 
dependent on the existing criteria for seriousness and aggravating and 
mitigating factors.129 Such a scheme could have the fine money go into 
the pool of revenue that gets redistributed to all schools within the 
                                                                                                                      
127 See, e.g., NCAA, Hobart College Public Infractions Report 1, 4 (2011), available at 
tp:/
financial penalty, inter alia, against Hobart for lack of institutional control in monitoring com-
ht /www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/News+Releases/ (follow “Jan. 
6, 2011—NCAA Committee on Infractions Issues Findings for Hobart College” hyperlink; then 
follow “Division I Committee on Infractions Public Report” hyperlink) (assessing a $70,500 
pliance of its Division I men’s lacrosse team); NCAA, Report No. 294, Florida State Uni-
versity 11 (2010), available at http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/ 
News+Releases/2010+News+Releases (follow “Jan. 5, 2010—NCAA Division I Infractions 
Appeals Committee Upholds Penalties for Florida State University” hyperlink; then follow 
“Division I Infractions Appeals Committee Public Report—Florida State University” hyperlink) 
(affirming penalties against an institution and programs after finding widespread academic 
fraud); Press Release, NCAA, Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision for Univer-
sity of Nevada, Reno (March 18, 2010), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
 ncaa/ncaa/media+and+events/press+room/news+release+archive/2010/infractions/20100 
318+d1+coi+nevada+reno+summ+rls (imposing a $1,500 financial penalty against the Uni- 
versity of Nevada at Reno for, inter alia, for an extra benefits violation, unethical conduct, and 
failure to promote rules compliance); Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Division I Infractions Ap-
peals Committee Upholds Penalties for University of Memphis (Mar. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/Med- 
ia+and+Events/Press+Room/News+Release+Archive/2010/Infractions/20100322+NCAA 
+News+Release+-+Division+I+Infractions+Appeals+Committee+Decision+on+Memphis 
(reporting that the IAC upheld a financial penalty against the University of Memphis of forfei-
ture of championship revenue gained from the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship, for 
player ineligibility due to an invalid SAT score); Infractions Case: University of Colorado, Boulder, 
NCAA ( July 2, 2007), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2007/Division+I/index. 
html (follow “Jul 2, 2007 1:01:30 AM Infractions case: University of Colorado, Boulder” hyper-
link). 
128 Four-Year Deal Includes Luxury Tax, No Contraction, ESPN (Aug. 30, 2002), http:// 
static.espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0830/1425253.html (“Teams whose payrolls exceed 
set thresholds will be taxed on the portions above the thresholds, with the money to be 
used for player benefits, including player benefit plans, or the industry growth fund, or 
developing baseball players in countries lacking organized high school baseball.”). 
129 For example, a penalty for a major infraction could range from 2% to 10% of ath-
letic department revenue. Alternatively, a penalty could be based as a higher percentage of 
expenses of a particular sports program, with the range dependent on the existing criteria 
for seriousness and aggravating and mitigating factors. For a football program such as the 
one at USC, that would amount to a penalty of millions of dollars, which might really deter 
even the wealthiest sports programs from looking the other way at wrongdoing within that 
program. Such a penalty scheme would truly punish and deter the involved sports pro-
gram while not impinging on the competitive opportunities of existing student-athletes. 
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NCAA division. For a school like USC, this penalty structure could have 
amounted to a financial penalty of as much as $25 million, with the 
money then distributed to schools that play by the rules. Such a penalty 
structure might be considered fairer than a uniform set of fines. 
 Approval of the NCAA Board of Directors may be required for the 
COI and the Infractions Appeals Committee (the “IAC”) to consider 
imposing and upholding such penalties, but it is feasible. Increased use 
of financial penalties would likely garner criticism from some of the 
bigger conferences as just another example of NCAA overregulation. It 
may also add further fuel to the contention that BCS conference 
schools would be better suited to leave the NCAA to form an organiza-
tion that better allows them to capture more of the revenue they gen-
sting 
pe wever, particularly the penalty of probation, are more 
offer student-athletes grants-in-aid only on a yearly basis.132 Because of 
NC
erate without having to share with their smaller brethren. The exi
nalties, ho
symbolic and do not appear really to deter the sort of wrongdoing that 
has captured media attention and has embarrassed the entire NCAA 
membership. 
3. Open Transfer for Current Students in Programs Under Major 
Sanction 
 Lastly, the transfer rules should be modified to permit a current 
student to transfer without penalty where he or she is in a program un-
der sanction for a major infraction.130 As it now stands, coaches can 
leave an institution at any time, even mid-season, without prohibition 
on or limitation in duties at a new NCAA member institution.131 Stu-
dents should be allowed to do the same. 
 There are several benefits of amending the rule. An open transfer 
rule would mitigate the imbalance in commitment by institutions that 
AA and conference transfer rules, student-athletes are not able to 
transfer and play without a significant delay. When compounded by the 
“four-in-five” rule that requires student-athletes to complete four years 
of N AA competition in only five yeC  ars of enrollment, student competi-
                                                                                                                      
130 See Youngman, supra note 123 (proposing a delay on postseason ban sanctions so 
that perclassmen could finish at th  orig up e inal institution and underclassmen could have 
the right to transfer when the bowl ban takes effect). In such case, however, the ban be-
comes even more remote from the period of offending conduct. 
131 llow-
ing th n). 
132 gher 
Educ. /. 
 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 19.02.1 (Show-Cause Order) (a
e NCAA to issue a “show cause” order to the institution hiring the coach in questio
 See Libby Sander, Justice Department Examines NCAA Scholarship Rules, Chron. Hi
, May 6, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Justice-Department-Examines/65430
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tive playing opportunities are unduly restricted.133 That the responsible 
coaches can continue to coach elsewhere, but the remaining student-
athletes, entitled only to the assurance of a one year scholarship, sit out 
r p
r new program, rather than via a 
blanket prohibition by the NCAA.134 
. C
o ay the sanctions, is incongruous. 
  An open transfer rule would certainly provide deterrence and in-
centives. A transferring athlete should be aware of the practical impli-
cations of transfer on academic record (for example, a class credit 
might not transfer). The prospect of an exodus of players would cer-
tainly provide deterrence and incentives for playing by the rules. An 
obvious drawback of an open transfer rule is the impact on rostered 
players at the receiving institution whose playing positions may be af-
fected. That contest for playing time, however, is a coaching decision. 
Ultimately the decision to transfer is best made by the individual stu-
dent-athletes, their families, and thei
4 ooperation with Professional Leagues and Player Unions on Agents 
 Although rules bar agents from contacting or providing benefits to 
NCAA student-athletes, reported cases show that in fact some agents do 
so.135 College sports need the cooperation of professional sports or-
ganizations to refrain from hiring coaches who have been sanctioned 
                                                                                                                      
133 See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 14, art. 14.2.1 (The Five Year Rule). The 
bylaws
ll-time program of studies in 
a collegiate institution, with time spent in the armed services, on official reli-
ent-
athl
e 50; Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From Regulat-
ing 
ers from 1990 to 1996). 
 provide as follows: 
A student-athlete shall complete his or her seasons of participation within five 
calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter in which the 
student-athlete first registered for a minimum fu
gious missions or with recognized foreign aid services of the U.S. government 
being excepted. For international students, service in the armed forces or on 
an official religious mission of the student’s home country is considered 
equivalent to such service in the United States. 
Id. 
134 This would also lessen the criticism that the NCAA membership exploits stud
etes for the profit of the schools. Commercialism of NCAA policies in college sports is 
highly critiqued. See generally Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles a Student-Athlete’s Dream, 
12 Sports Law. J. 221 (2005); Lockhart, supra not
Organization to Multi-Billion Dollar Business: The NCAA Is Commercializing the Amateur Com-
petition It Has Taken Almost a Century to Create, 13 Seton Hall J. Sports L. 321 (2003). 
135 See, e.g., Dohrmann, supra note 14 (reporting that ex-NFL player agent Josh Luchs 
admitted to having paid thousands of dollars, in addition to other benefits, to more than 
thirty college football play
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by the NCAA.136 Professional sports presumably are similarly concerned 
with the reputation and public perceptions of their franchises. As such, 
professional sports franchises should refrain from hiring sanctioned 
personnel and admonish franchises that engage in such practices. Simi-
larly, athlete-agents are bound by the laws of the state in which they op-
erate. States should pass le o effectively bar agents 
map,” may be a calculated advantage 
gislation aiming t
from practicing within the state if the agent (or a representative of the 
agent) induces a student-athlete to violate an NCAA bylaw. 
Conclusion 
 Elite intercollegiate sports competition involves more than a vil-
lage: the student-athletes, parents and supporters, coaches, teammates, 
university, fans, agents, and professional leagues are all stakeholders. It 
also requires fair competition, compliance with agreed-upon rules of 
competitive play, and a process to ensure enforcement of those rules. 
The temptations to gain a competitive advantage through payment of 
extra benefits to a prospect or student-athlete, his or her family, or an 
AAU coach can surround participants in a successful athletic program. 
Perhaps the short-term benefits of cheating, such as the reward of be-
ing “put on the college sports 
outweighing the risk of sanctions. But that the win-at-all-costs mentality 
may pay off for an NCAA member institution or coach, while penaliz-
ing others who have played by the rules, warrants a reassessment of how 
sanctions can be more effective. 
 In the exciting world of intercollegiate sports, a single organiza-
tion, the NCAA, can only do so much. This Article suggests a variety of 
ways to better match the punishment to the infraction and responsible 
party: hold head coaches financially accountable for program viola-
tions, mandate institutional disgorgement of winnings and financial 
penalties, permit transfer for innocent students stuck in the current 
sanctioned programs, and facilitate cooperation with the professional 
leagues and players unions on unscrupulous agents. Ultimately, it is up 
to all of us to stop feeding the arms race beast and put sports in per-
spective. Coaches, students, institutions, agents, boosters, and player 
families need to realize that cheating is not an option to consider in a 
                                                                                                                      
136 See NFLPA Decertifies Agent Who Says He Paid College Players, NFL (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81b8277b/article/nflpa-decertifies-agent-who-
says-he-paid-college-players (reporting that through recommendation by its Committee on 
Agent Regulations and Discipline, the NFL Players Association decertified Josh Luchs, the 
agent who paid players). 
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ols need to police them-
selves and implement safeguards, as well as hire coaches to be exem-
plary leaders and mentors who institute a culture of compliance. 
Integrity, student-athlete development, and a healthy sport experience 
should be rewarded as much as, or more than, wins. The spirit of the 
late John Wooden should not be lost. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, reflecting 
on his former coach, put it best: “Coach Wooden enjoyed winning, but 
he did not put winning above everything. He was more concerned that 
we became successful as human beings, that we earned our degrees, 
that we learned to make the right choices as adults and as parents. . . . 
In essence . . . he was preparing us for life.”137 
                                                                                                                     
cost-benefit analysis; rather, those involved must take responsibility, re-
fuse to cheat, and report those who do. Scho
 
137 Frank Litsky & John Branch, John Wooden, Who Built an Incomparable Dynasty at UCLA, 
Dies at 99, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2010, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/ 
sports/ncaabasketball/05wooden.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1. Among Coach Wooden’s maxims 
was the following: “Be more concerned with your character than your reputation, because 
your character is what you really are, while your reputation is merely what others think you 
are.” Id. For more information about Coach John Wooden, see Official Site Coach John 
Wooden, http://www.coachwooden.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
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